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A Specialized Court for Immigration
Hearings and Appeals
Peerj. Levinson *
I. Introduction
The United States immigration adjudication system is beset with crippling
problems. Immigration judges occupy positions of unhealthy dependence within
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the Service),' lack adequate sup-
port services, and frequently face debilitating conflicts with agency personnel.
Board of Immigration Appeals members perform appellate functions without job
security or statutory recognition. Long delays pervade the quasi-judicial hearing
and appellate process. The availability of further review in federal courts
postpones finality, encourages litigation, and undermines the authority of initial
appellate determinations. 2 This article examines the process by which persons
are excluded or expelled from the United States, describes the present system's
problems, and suggests structural alternatives.
II. The Present System
The Service employs forty immigration judges handling an annual caseload
of approximately 4,000 exclusion and 58,000 deportation cases.3 Exclusion pro-
ceedings involve hearings on the admissibility 4 of aliens denied "entry" 5 to the
United States by immigration officers at land borders or ports.6 Aliens within
* Consultant, Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. A.B., Brandeis University,
1965; J.D., Harvard University, 1968. This article is based in part on Immigration Hearings and Appeals:
A Structural Study (June 1980) (unpublished paper prepared for the Select Commission by the author).
The views expressed in this article are the author's own opinions and do not necessarily reflect the opinions
of the Select Commission.
I The Immigration and Naturalization Service is the agency within the Department of Justice that
performs enforcement, service, and adjudicatory functions relating to the immigration and naturalization
laws. The Attorney General possesses statutory authority, with certain exceptions, to administer and en-
force these laws. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1976). He generally has delegated concurrent authority to the Com-
missioner of the Service, who in turn has made various subdelegations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 2.1, 103.1 (1980).
2 Judicial review is an important safeguard under present circumstances. The layering of review,
however, may be eliminated by providing an initial judicial (rather than quasi-judicial) hearing and ap-
peal. See text accompanying note 14 infia.
3 These figures are based on cases received in fiscal year 1980. Dispositions did not keep pace with
new cases. In fiscal year ("FY") 1980 completed exclusion cases totalled 3,100; completed deportation
cases equaled 45,034, a decline from the 55,886 figure for FY 1979. 1,596 exclusion cases and 29,267
deportation cases were pending at the end of FY 1980. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS (FY 1979, 1980).
4 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) specifies 33 separately numbered classes of aliens that are inadmissible to the
United States. Some of these classes include numerous subclasses. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a) (West 1970 &
Supp. 1981).
5 Entry is broadly defined by statute to include the return of a lawful permanent resident from a
temporary visit abroad. Thus, reentering lawful permanent residents are subjected anew to all the
grounds of exclusion except the literacy requirement. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(13), 1182(a)(25) (1976). In
Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), the Supreme Court ameliorated the rigidity of the reentry doc-
trine for persons whose visits abroad are "innocent, casual and brief," id. at 462, but lower federal courts
have divided in interpreting the scope of the Fleuti decision.
6 To qualify for an exclusion hearing a person must physically reach the United States. An alien
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the United States may be expelled for a variety of causes 7 through deportation.
Immigration judges are based at eighteen cities around the country and fre-
quently travel to other locations to hold hearings.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board), an administrative appellate
entity, reviews the exclusion and deportation decisions of immigration judges at
the request of either the alien or the Service.8 The five member Board exists by
authority of regulation (rather than statute) as part of the Department of Justice
and is "subject to the general supervision of the Deputy Attorney General." 9
The Board disposes of approximately 2,800 cases per year.' 0 On rare occasions
the Commissioner exercises a regulatory rightI' to seek the Attorney General's
review of Board decisions. By statute, final Board deportation orders are review-
able solely upon the alien's petition directly to a United States court of appeals. ' 2
Board exclusion decisions are not subject to direct appellate judicial scrutiny but
may be reviewed by habeas corpus in the United States district courts.' 3
A number of objectives are significant in considering the range of options for
handling the present case-load of immigration judges and the Board: (1) Offi-
cials performing hearing and appellate adjudicatory functions should possess se-
curity, compensation and stature commensurate with the nature of their
responsibilities. These requisites are essential to attracting highly qualified attor-
neys to these positions. (2) The independence of immigration judges should be
safeguarded by their insulation from direct or indirect pressure from enforcement
officials. Such pressure can compromise the integrity of decisionmaking, create
intolerable working conditions, and undermine the essential appearance of fair-
ness that should characterize hearings. (3) Immigration judges should receive
support services adequate to enable them to decide cases expeditiously. (4) Na-
tional uniformity in immigration decisional law should be promoted to ensure
fairness and discourage litigation. (5) Unnecessary layering of review should be
eliminated.
III. The Immigration Judge's Predicament
Presently, immigration judges in the United States operate in an atmos-
phere of crisis. These quasi-judicial officials generally consider themselves to be
working under untenable conditions: they are subject to inappropriate interfer-
ence from law enforcement personnel, lack the necessary control over the admin-
denied an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa by a consular officer abroad has no access to a formal review.
Moreover, the grant of a visa by a consular officer abroad does not bind the immigration officer at the
place of entry. In effect, the immigration officer takes a second look at the individual's admissibility.
7 The grounds for deportation are delineated in 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976 & Supp. 1978).
8 The jurisdiction of the Board also includes review of immigration judge bond determinations and
decisions of district directors on certain types of applications and petitions. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1980). Deci-
sions of district directors on most categories of applications and petitions, however, are reviewable by the
four regional commissioners within the Service and never reach the Board. 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(m) (1980)
delineates the appellate jurisdiction of regional commissioners.
9 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1) (1980).
10 The exact figures for FY 1980 are "2,762 cases involving 3,189 aliens." Board of Immigration Ap-
peals' Annual Report for FY 1980. Deportation cases represent the majority of the Board's caseload. 8
C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1980) lists other types of cases included in the 2,762 figure.
11 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1980). Board decisions also can be referred to the Attorney General either by
direction of the Attorney General or by request of "[t]he Chairman or a majority of the Board." Id.
12 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1976).
13 Id. § 1105a(b) (1976).
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istration of their own hearings, and lack the resources needed to carry out their
essential functions. In an effort to understand these pressing concerns, the Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (the Select Commission) 1 4 solic-
ited the views of numerous people involved in immigration matters. The written
and oral responses revealed strong sentiment for major structural change
designed to provide immigration judges greater independence.
Although vested with authority to make independent decisions in cases in-
volving the deportation or exclusion of aliens, immigration judges work under
the administrative supervision of Service enforcement personnel. Presently "Re-
gional Commissioners exercise administrative supervision .. ". -15 David
Dixon, Special Assistant to the Commissioner, is "temporarily . . . coor-
dinat[ing]" "[p]rofessional supervision and legal matters affecting the judges,
which would normally be within the scope of the Chief Immigration Judge's
duties .... ,,6 Immigration judges are dependent on district directors and re-
gional commissioners for office space, hearing facilities, equipment, supplies, cler-
ical and transcription support, translating personnel, travel authorization and
reimbursement, and maintenance of case files.
Tension pervades relations between many enforcement personnel and immi-
gration judges. A number of district directors perceive the immigration judges as
working at cross-purposes to those of the district directors, view the immigration
judges' goals as antithetical to the Service's mission, and express their contempt
for the immigration judges. 17 Testimony delivered before the Select Commission
in April 1980, on behalf of the Association of Immigration Directors, confirms
that many district directors view the present role of immigration judges nega-
tively:
The need for economy and efficiency in the delivery of public service dictates a re-
view of the statutory basis, if any, for the costly and inefficient system of so-called
"Immigration Courts" and "Immigration Judges" that seems to have been dictated
by the cry for due process .... [T]he system as it has developed over the past dec-
ade particularly, has gone from a relatively simple but complete "lay" hearing to a
most complex legal bureaucracy serving only to confuse and make it costly to the
aliens and the government in the process.
1 8
14 The Select Commission is a presidential-congressional commission with a mandate to "study and
evaluate ... existing laws, policies, and procedures governing the admission of immigrants and refugees
to the United States and to make such administrative and legislative recommendations to the President
and to the Congress as are appropriate." Immigration and Nationality Act-Refugee Policy, Pub. L. No.
95-412 § 4(c), 92 Stat. 907 (1978).
15 Letter from Acting Commissioner David Crosland to Immigration Judge Joseph W. Monsanto
(Mar. 20, 1980) (copy in Select Commission files).
16 Id. The position of chief immigrationjudge has been vacant since August 1979, awaiting a decision
from the Department of Justice on the possible removal of immigration judges from the Service.
17 See, e.g., Memorandum re Association of Immigration Directors' Conference with Commissioner
Castillo (Dec. 14, 1977) (copy in Select Commission files).
It was pointed out that no individual change adding to SIO [special inquiry officer or immigra-
tion judge] authority to veto decisional authority historically excercised [sic] by DIDIR's [dis-
trict directors] was, in itself, of major significance; but that in the aggregate the many changes
had resulted in creation of a complex legal bureaucracy that hindered Service mission accom-
plishment, increased costs and was of more benefit to the legal trade than to the aliens.
Id. The memorandum refers to the robes of immigration judges as "the black nightgowns they frequently
wear when conducting hearings." Id.
18 Submission on behalf of Association of Immigration Directors, Select Commission Chicago Re-
gional Hearing, Apr. 21, 1980 (copy in Select Commission files).
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Although the merits of the trend toward increased recognition of aliens' procedu-
ral rights can be debated at length, having district directors determine the sup-
port needs of immigration judges is fraught with problems.' 9
David Dixon, Special Assistant to the Commissioner, recently acknowledged
that "the advantages of separating the immigration judges from [the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service] are large" 20 and that "something must be done"
about the potential for abuse in a situation where immigration judges are
"staffed and supported administratively by the district directors. ' 21 Board
Chairman David Milhollan observed that it "seemed to be the consensus, it al-
ways has been our view, that the Judges should be separate from [the] Immigra-
tion Service."'22 Chairman Milhollan referred to "the fact that the work of
Immigration Judges doesn't always receive from District Directors the highest
priorities,"'2 3 and concluded that immigration judges should have the "opportu-
nity to take care of their own work themselves." 24
Service enforcement personnel's frequently antagonistic attitude toward im-
migration judges perhaps results from both (1) immigration judges' ambiguous
semi-autonomous status and (2) district directors' awkward position as enforce-
ment personnel having some responsibility for quasi-judicial officials. "It is now
clear," one immigration judge wrote to the Select Commission, "that these Direc-
tors and their subordinates view our role as renegade Immigration Officers who
are usurpers of authority and frauds in our role as Judges."'25 Letters to the Se-
lect Commission from immigration judges document a variety of irritating intru-
sions by enforcement personnel into immigration judges' operations. "Fair and
impartial hearings are not possible," another immigration judge advised the Se-
lect Commission, "when one of the parties in each case controls the court sys-
tem." 26 The immigration judge found that "[t]he strong desire to influence the
judges directly or indirectly is repugnantly clear."'2 7 The independence of immi-
gration judges should be clarified and the conflicting roles of enforcement offi-
cials should be eliminated. In short, a compelling case exists for removing
immigration judges from the Service entirely.
IV. Immigration Judges and Administrative Law Judges: A Comparison
Thirty federal agencies employ over 1,000 administrative law judges to per-
19 Support needs are not in fact being met. Many immigration judges point to a chronic lack of
adequate clerical assistance. Letters from immigration judges (in Select Commission files). Also, appeals
tO the Board often face inordinate transcription delays.
20 Executive Summary, Consultation on "Qyasi-Judicial Quandaries." Over Due Process," SELECT COM-
MISSION ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, 2D SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., 196, 197-98 (Joint Print of House and Senate Committees on Judiciary (Oct. 1980)[hercinafter cited
as Consultation, 2D SEMIANNUAL REPORT]. This consultation or miniseminar, organized by Select Com-
mission Director of Legal Research Mary Jo Grotenrath, focused on issues relating to immigration judges
and the Board.
21 Transcript of Consultation (described at note 20, supra) 38 (unpublished transcript in Select Com-
mission files).
22 Consultation, 2D SEMIANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 203.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Immigration judge correspondence with Select Commission (in Select Commission files).
26 Id.
27 Id.
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form a variety of quasi-judicial tasks.2 8 Candidates for administrative law judge
positions must meet threshold experience requirements, receive adequate scores
rating various qualities, prepare an acceptable written opinion, and satisfactorily
participate in an interview. The Office of Administrative Law Judges, in the
Office of Personnel Management, prepares a register of applicants who have suc-
cessfully completed the screening process. An agency wanting to fill a position
must pick from among the three top candidates unless it has been authorized to
impose specialized experience requirements (selective certification) in the sub-
stantive area of the agency's work. Selective certification permits an agency to
bypass top names on the general register and choose from among the leading
candidates with specialized experience. An agency may also bypass candidates
on the register by selecting an administrative law judge already employed by
another agency.
29
By contrast, the selection process for immigration judges parallels that used
for filling other civil service management and supervisory positions within the
Service. First, by referring to the civil service qualifications handbook, a Service
staffing specialist in the central office determines whether a candidate meets the
requirements. Next, the specialist separates those who hold or have held competi-
tive appointments (status candidates) from non-status candidates. If the number
of status candidates does not exceed seven,30 the candidates' names are submitted
in alphabetical order to the Commissioner. Non-status candidates are evaluated
and ranked by the Office of Personnel Management. The Commissioner is al-
lowed unlimited discretion in selecting a new immigration judge from among
applicants on either the status or non-status list.
Unlike administrative law judges, immigration judges do not enjoy special
protection within the civil service system. Unless they possess career status at the
time of their appointment, immigration judges cannot attain such status without
serving a one year probationary period and accumulating three years of continu-
ous service. Regardless of prior government career experience, administrative
law judges can be removed "only for good cause established and determined by
the Merit System Protection Board on the record after opportunity for hear-
ing.' ' 31 Immigration judges are evaluated periodically by the Service for pay
increases, a responsibility that usually devolves on the chief immigration judge.32
By contrast, administrative law judges are "entitled to pay prescribed by the
Office of Personnel Management independently of agency recommendations or
ratings . . . . 33 The Supreme Court has stated that "Congress intended to
make [administrative law judges] 'a special class of semi-independent
subordinate hearing officers' by vesting control of their compensation, promotion
28 For detailed descriptive and statistical information on the caseloads of administrative law judges in
various agencies, see ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE HEARINGS-STATISTICAL REPORT for 1976-1978, 21 (July 1980) [hereinafter-cited as ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE CONFERENCE, STATISTICAL REPORT].
29 For an analysis of the selection process, see Mans, Selecting the "H'ddenJudiiag" (pts. 1-2), 63 JUD.
60, 130 (1979).
30 A panel of three immigration judges is convened to rank in order the top seven status candidates in
the unlikely event more than seven status applicants are available. This contingency has not arisen in at
least the last five years.
31 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (1976 & Supp. 1978).
32 The chief immigration judge position has been vacant for over 16 months. Set note 16, supra.
33 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (1976 & Supp. 1978).
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and tenure in the Civil Service Commission to a much greater extent than in the
case of other federal employees."
'34
Changing the position of immigration judge to that of administrative law
judge would offer several advantages over the present system. First, the Office of
Administrative Law Judges, an entity specifically concerned with merit selection
of quasi-judicial officials, would play a major role in the appointment process.
This involvement could result in the elimination of some unqualified or margin-
ally qualified candidates and lead to greater efforts to recruit qualified members
of the private bar. Second, as quasi-judicial officials, persons given positions
would receive job security upon appointment regardless of their prior competi-
tive government appointments. Job security would promote independence of ac-
tion and might induce potential candidates to give up other secure positions.
Third, placing control over compensation in the Office of Administrative Law
Judges rather than in the appointing agency would augment quasi-judicial inde-
pendence. Finally, administrative law judges concerned with immigration mat-
ters probably would receive GS (General Schedule) 16 appointments rather than
the GS 15 position of immigration judges.35 GS 16 is the grade of administrative
law judges in most federal agencies. The nature of the responsibilities presently
exercised by immigration judges justifies appointments at this level.36
The Service's employment of administrative law judges rather than immi-
gration judges would not, however, solve the most serious problem facing quasi-
judicial personnel. The most serious problem3 7 stems from the immigration
judges' dependence on an agency primarily concerned with enforcement. Ad-
ministrative law judges' dependence on the agencies that employ them for facili-
ties and support services seems to pose fewer problems because the major missions
of these agencies, unlike those of the Service, do not conflict, or are not widely
perceived to conflict, with the roles of persons responsible for hearing functions.
Administrative law judges assigned immigration judge functions could be re-
moved from the Service and assigned either to an independent entity within the
Department of Justice comparable to the United States Parole Commission 38 or
to a new independent agency modeled on an existing independent adjudicatory
agency.3 9
V. The Vulnerability of the Board of Immigration Appeals
An appellate body such as the Board of Immigration Appeals is needed to
harmonize decisions of immigration judges around the country and provide na-
34 Ramspect v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132 (1953) (footnote omitted).
The role of the Civil Service Commission has been assumed by the Office of Personnel Management and
the Merit Systems Protection Board.
35 The present $50,112.50 ceiling on the amount actually payable under the general schedule results
in a compression of wages. As a result, some persons at GS 15 (those at step 5 and above) and all persons
at GS 16 reach the ceiling. See Exec. Order No. 12,248, 45 Fed. Reg. 69,199 (1980). Congress, of course,
may act to raise the ceiling and ease the compression.
36 The Office of Personnel Management classifies administrative law judges, although Congress occa-
sionally specifies a minimum classification.
37 See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
38 See text accompanying note 47 infra.
39 The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission and the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Commission provide good models for establishing an immigration adjudicatory agency without a
link to a government department.
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tionwide authority in immigration law. The elimination of an appellate body
would likely produce more disparate treatment of aliens in the different parts of
the United States. Moreover, by subjecting decisions of individual immigration
judges to a process of collective scrutiny, an appellate body provides an impor-
tant error correcting function. Abolishing the Board without establishing an-
other institution capable of performing its functions would exacerbate federal
court caseload problems.
Unlike the immigration judge structure, the Board is insulated from the
Service. This advantage, however, must be balanced against the precariousness
of the Board's existence. While immigration judges perform statutory func-
tions,4° Board members derive their authority solely from regulation. An Attor-
ney General dissatisfied with the Board's operations could abolish the Board. Its
lack of statutory standing, a subject of strong criticism, 4 1 undermines the Board's
stature, renders service on the Board less secure and thus less attractive, and
threatens the Board's independence. In any event the Board's fate should not
rest in the hands of an agency that appears before the Board as an advocate.
The Attorney General's ability to review Board decisions inappropriately
injects a law enforcement official into a quasi-judicial appellate process, creates
an unnecessary layer of review, compromises the appearance of independent
Board decisionmaking, and undermines the Board's stature generally. The At-
torney General assumes a posture of inevitable conflict when he is required to
evaluate the merits of advocacy positions assumed by his own Department.
Moreover, the subordination of the Board's collective judgment to a single indi-
vidual's opinion reverses a sound principle of appellate scrutiny: that the deci-
sion of one judge is best reviewed by a collegial body. Although authorized to act
independently in its decisionmaking role, the Board hardly can avoid taking into
account its perception of the Attorney General's likely view.
Speaking at the Select Commission Consultation on Quasi-Judicial Quanda-
ries, 42 Board Chairman David Milhollan referred to a number of prior studies of
the Board and noted that "[c]ommon to all of the reports. . . has been the rec-
ommendation that the Board be elevated in stature."'43 Chairman Milhollan ex-
pressed his personal wholehearted support for upgrading the position of Board
member, concurred "in the recommendation that the Board be established by
statute, '44 and favored eliminating Attorney General review of Board deci-
sions. 45 Comparing the Board of Immigration Appeals with the United States
Parole Commission underscores some of the points raised by Chairman Milhol-
Ian.
The United States Parole Commission exemplifies a statutory "independent
agency in the Department ofJustice" 46 functioning without supervision from the
40 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1976), which provides that deportation proceedings shall be conducted by
a special inquiry officer. The statute should be read in conjunction with 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(1) (1980), which
specifies that "[t]he term 'immigration judge' means special inquiry officer ... .
41 See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE SHALL
WELCOME 160 (1953).
42 See note 20, supra, for a description of this consultation.
43 Consultation, 2D SEMIANNUAL REPORT, upra note 20, at 203.
44 Id. See also Roberts, The Board of Immigration Appeals: A CriticalAppraisal, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29
(1977) (advocating an upgraded statutory Board).
45 Consultation, 2D SEMIANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 204.
46 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1976).
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Attorney General or his subordinates. Parole Commission members are ap-
pointed by the President, and confirmed by the Senate, to positions at the GS 18
level 47 for terms of six years. By contrast, Board of Immigration Appeals mem-
bers receive appointments from the Attorney General at the GS 15 level (except
for a GS 16 Chairman) and serve at the discretion of the Attorney General. Al-
though the Board of Immigration Appeals fulfills responsibilities of importance
comparable to those of the Parole Commission, 48 Board members do not enjoy
comparable security, stature, or statutorily recognized independence. A very
modest proposal for upgrading and safeguarding the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals might involve enacting legislation comparable to the 1976 act 49 that estab-
lished the United States Parole Commission as the successor to the United States
Board of Parole. Immigration judges or administrative law judges responsible for
hearing and deciding deportation and exclusion cases could be attached to the
new body.
Independent adjudicatory agencies 50 also provide models for an administra-
tive entity which might accommodate the Board of Immigration Appeals and the
immigration judges. Persons performing appellate immigration adjudicatory
functions might occupy positions analogous to those of commission members, en-
joying presidential appointments subject to Senate confirmation, fixed terms of
office, and compensation at level IV of the executive schedule.51 Immigration
hearing and appellate officers arguably should not maintain even a loose affilia-
tion with a law enforcement entity; the independent agency model offers the
advantage of a structure without any link to the Department of Justice. Immi-
gration judges or administrative law judges could be assigned to the new agency.
VI. A New Specialized Court
The specialized judicial model provides the best solution to the dilemma of
establishing an appropriate institutional framework for immigration judge and
Board of Immigration Appeals functions.52 Although quasi-judicial models-
such as the United States Parole Commission and independent adjudicatory
agencies--promise a substantial improvement over the present immigration sys-
tem, they do not provide the advantages inherent in leaving critical liberty-re-
lated questions to courts. Judicial forums are available for resolving many
controversies of less importance to individuals than whether they should be ex-
pelled or excluded from the United States. Courts are accustomed to making
47 The $50,112.50 ceiling applies to all persons at GS 18. See note 35 supra.
48 The Parole Commission passes on parole applications, imposes parole conditions, and modifies or
revokes parole orders.
49 Pub. L. No. 94-233 (1976).
50 See note 39 supra.
51 The present ceiling on the amount payable to a person with a level IV appointment is $52,750.00
Pub. L. No. 96-369, 94 Stat. 1351 (1980), Exec. Order No. 12,248, 45 Fed. Reg. 69,199 (1980). The ceiling
for a level III appointment (the appropriate level for the chairman of the adjudicatory entity) is
$55,387.50. Id.
52 On various occasions Congress has recognized that a judicial forum provides a more appropriate
structure for resolving controversies that had been left to executive decisionmaking in the past. This recog-
nition is exemplified in the creation of the United States Customs Court (now known as the United States
Court of International Trade) to replace the Board of General Appraisers. The Board of Tax Appeals
evolved into the Tax Court of the United States and then into the United States Tax Court. For a history
of the evolution of tax adjudications, see H. DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAx COURT-AN HIsTORI-
CAL ANALYsIs (1979).
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judgments affecting the rights of disenfranchised persons or unpopular minorities
without bowing to political expediency. The judicial tradition of strict indepen-
dence and adherence to the rule of law makes courts ideal bodies for resolving
questions where the sanction, although not denominated criminal, may involve
a severe deprivation of liberty. Moreover, courts can best provide a process that
appears fair to a person who may never again be exposed to American justice.
Creating a specialized court system can be justified by the fact that immi-
gration judges already perform essentially judicial functions. Immigration judges
decide cases involving alleged law violations on the evidence presented. Immi-
gration judges' discretionary authority to provide various forms of relief requires
their weighing equitable considerations-a task judges of trial courts frequently
confront. Expulsion from the United States, a sanction which may be more
onerous than imprisonment, differs qualitatively from any penalties that admin-
istrative law judges impose. 53 To a great extent, placing immigration judge func-
tions within a specialized court structure may simply recognize the practical
result of the increased judicialization of the hearing officer's position. This
judicialization has included: (1) authorizing hearing officers to decide cases
(rather than limiting them-as they were once limited and as some administra-
tive law'judges remain limited-to making recommendations); (2) filling the po-
sition of special inquiry officer exclusively with attorneys; (3) relieving special
inquiry officers of non-adjudicatory functions (by the assignment of trial attor-
neys with prosecutorial functions in contested cases); and (4) designating special
inquiry officers as immigration judges.54
The position of United States magistrate provides a possible model for a new
immigration magistrate charged with the responsibilities currently discharged by
immigration judges. The Federal Magistrates Act of 1968 "created the new of-
fice of United States magistrate to emphasize the judicial nature of the position
and to denote a break with the commissioner system."'55 More recent legislation
has resolved jurisdictional ambiguities and given explicit sanction to a broad
range of potential responsibilities for United States magistrates.
5 6
53 Penalties vary among agencies. They may include the imposition of monetary fines or damages,
the issuance of cease and desist orders, the recall of products, the publication of adverse findings, and the
suspension or revocation of licenses, permits and registrations. For an agency by agency description of
penalties imposed by administrative law judges, see ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE, STATISTICAL RE-
PORT, supra note 28. Administrative law judge penalties sometimes have considerable business and
financial implications but do not deprive individuals of basic freedoms.
54 See generally IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW & PRACTICE § 5.7 (rev. ed.
1980).
55 McCabe, The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 HARV. J. ON LEcis. 343, 348 (1979) (footnote omit-
ted) (citing Hearings on the Federal Magistrate Act Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in theJudicial Machiner of
the Sen. Comm. on theJudiciar, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1966) (staff memorandum)).
56 See McCabe, supra note 55, for a detailed analysis of 1976 and 1979 enactments. United States
district courts today can designate magistrates to (1) try persons charged with misdemeanors (with the
consent of the accused), 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1976); (2) "hear and determine," subject to possible district
court reconsideration, "any pretrial matter [with certain exceptions, generally dispositive motions] pend-
ing before the court ...." in either civil or criminal cases, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1976); (3) submit
proposed findings and dispositional recommendations (subject to possible district court de novo review)
on dispositive motions in civil or criminal matters, id.; and (4) conduct (with the consent of the parties)
"any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case
.... with a right of appeal directly to the United States court of appeals unless "at the time of reference
to a magistrate, the parties . . . further consent to appeal on the record to a judge of the district court
... " Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 2(2), 93 Stat. 643 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), (3), (4)).
[April 19811
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Although magistrates, as adjuncts of United States district courts, 5 7 perform
a significant role in the disposition of federal litigation, they do not offer the best
institutional model for hearing officers in deportation and exclusion cases. The
United States already has a functioning group of immigration judges; a change
in title to magistrate might frustrate efforts to recruit highly qualified lawyers to
accept appointments. The positions of various judicial and quasi-judicial offi-
cials-including magistrates, bankruptcy judges, and administrative law
judges-have been upgraded in recent years; redesignating persons performing
immigration judge functions as magistrates would be antithetical to that trend.
Unlike magistrates, immigration judges do not depend on delegations from other
officials in order to exercise their most significant jurisdiction and do not require
the consent of the parties. The magistrate closely resembles an arbitrator. By
contrast, immigration judges function like judges. The jurisdiction of immigra-
tion judges, moreover, is distinct from that of any existing federal court. Thus,
exclusion and deportation cases most appropriately can be heard by "judges"
housed in a new immigration court.
An immigration court could eliminate the layering of review that character-
izes present jurisdictional arrangements. Today a person subject to a final Board
deportatitin or exclusion order has statutory remedies in article III courts 5 8 -by
direct appeal to a United States court of appeals in a deportation case and by
petition for habeas corpus to a United States district court in an exclusion case.
Litigation may even go further. A court of appeals decision in a deportation
matter may be reviewed by the Supreme Court on petition for certiorari, 59 and a
district court habeas corpus ruling in an exclusion matter may be appealed to a
court of appeals with subsequent Supreme Court scrutiny on petition for certio-
rari a possibility.60 Also, the final Board order triggering these potential reme-
dies in article III courts is itself a quasi-judicial appellate remedy.
Congress could provide a single right of review in an appellate division of
the new immigration court. Such a structure would generally eliminate the pres-
ent statutory involvement of courts of appeals in deportation cases and both dis-
trict courts and courts of appeals in exclusion cases. Discretionary Supreme
Court review may be retained to preserve the Court's supremacy in matters of
national law.
A new immigration court would introduce uniformity in immigration deci-
sional law. Initial appellate decisions would no longer be subject to potentially
disparate rulings by courts of appeals in different circuits. Greater cohesion and
less confusion could be expected to characterize immigration law in the future.
Moreover, eliminating layers of appellate review may encourage litigants to ac-
cord greater deference to prior appellate opinions when deciding whether to ap-
peal.6 1
The availability of review in the appellate division of the new immigration
57 See McCabe, supra note 55 at 369-74.
58 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
59 28 U.S.C. § 2350 (1976).
60 Because of the exigencies of the Supreme Court's heavy caseload, however, petitions for certiorari
are granted in only a small percentage of cases.
61 The Board essentially functions as a tribunal of intermediate appellate jurisdiction. Today unfa-
vorable precedent may not discourage attorneys from relitigating old issues because of an expectation that
a federal court ultimately may agree with an argument repeatedly rejected by the Board.
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court would provide litigants an adequate remedy to safeguard individual rights.
Even persons convicted of serious federal crimes generally qualify for only one
appeal. Repeated review does not necessarily lead to better decisions. More-
over, the societal cost of postponing finality can be enormous. The greatest pro-
tections for persons involved in deportation and exclusion proceedings would
derive from the capacity of the new court's trial and appellate divisions to up-
grade the quality of adjudications.
To date Congress has created six federal courts combining specialized juris-
diction and specialized judges.62 Ample historical precedent can be found for
creating a specialized immigration court. In recent years considerable contro-
versy has centered on the advisability of expanding the list of specialized courts
to include additional substantive areas. The debate over whether to route spe-
cialized cases to judges with generalized experience (who arguably can offer a
broad legal perspective) or to route them to specialized judges (who arguably
possess the expertise to resolve complex cases thoughtfully and expeditiously)
need not deter Congress from creating a new article I United States Immigration
Court,63 with a trial and appellate division, to decide cases that already are being
decided by specialists. The controversy over the appropriate role of specialized
courts must be faced, however, if Congress is to provide generally for final review
in the new court's appellate division.
A specialized appellate division, staffed with outstanding lawyers, need not
succumb to arcane interpretations of immigration law or identify with the Serv-
ice. First, recruitment efforts could emphasize broad legal experience. The new
positions would provide an attractive professional opportunity to members of
both the private and the public bar. An immigration court nominating commis-
sion could perform an important recruiting and screening role for the new
court.6 4 Second, the continued involvement of federal district courts and courts
of appeals in some immigration-related matters65 would ensure a healthy ex-
change of ideas between the specialized judges of the new immigration court and
the generalized judges of article III courts. Third, Supreme Court review by
petition for certiorari would permit occasional scrutiny of appellate division
cases. The very existence of Supreme Court review would serve as a reminder to
the Immigration Court that its rulings must fit within the more general fabric of
the law.
62 These six courts are the United States Court of Claims, the United States Court of International
Trade (discussed in note 52, supra), the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the United
States Tax Court (discussed in note 52, supra), the United States Court of Military Appeals, and the
United States Bankruptcy Court. In addition, two specialized federal courts, the Rail Reorganization
Court and the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, are staffed on a rotational basis by federal judges
who do not generally specialize in the substantive work of the court on which they temporarily serve.
63 The United States Tax Court and the United States Court of Military Appeals are the two pres-
ently existing federal courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction explicitly established under article I (the
legislative powers provision) of the Constitution. See 10 U.S.C. § 867 and 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1976). Article
I courts (legislative courts) are to be distinguished from constitutional courts established under article III
(the judicial powers provision) of the Constitution. Judge Joseph Monsanto, President of the National
Association of Immigration Judges, has vigorously advocated an article I court for immigration hearing
functions. See, e.g., J. Monsanto, Immigration Court Under Article I of the Constitution (unpublished
proposed statute and rules for an immigration court) (copy in Select Commission files).
64 Cf. Exec. Order No. 12,064, 43 Fed. Reg. 24,661 (1978) (United States Tax Court Nominating
Commission).
65 Constitutional habeas corpus remedies, for example.
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VII. Conclusion
An article I court offers distinct advantages over an independent, upgraded
quasi-judicial structure. A federal court is more likely than a Board or Commis-
sion to attract the highest qualified adjudicators because of the status, security,
independence, and challenge associated with judicial service. Unlike some ad-
ministrative agencies, federal courts can command adequate support services. A
new court could resolve immigration cases definitively without the layering of
review and duplication of effort inherent in having both quasi-judicial and judi-
cial structures. Finally, a new court could introduce certainty in immigration
decisional law. Such certainty could not be achieved with a new administrative
structure.
Article I of the Constitution permits innovation. The creation of an immi-
gration court need not encumber the deportation and exclusion process with pro-
cedural rigidity. Immigration court rules, for example, could provide for
flexibility in the reception of evidence and the participation of non-attorneys.
66
Many institutional and jurisdictional questions need to be addressed as further
consideration is given to establishing a new immigration court. The nation's
prior experience with specialized courts should provide guidance in this effort.
66 Cf. R. OF PRAC. & PROC. OF THE U.S. TAX CT., R. 177(b) (providing for admissibility in "[t]rials
of small tax cases" of "any evidence deemed by the Court to have probative value") and R. 200(a)(3)
(establishing a procedure for admission of non-attorneys to practice).
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